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Have You Updated Your Toaster? Transatlantic
Approaches to Governing the Internet of
Everything
SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD† & SCOTT O. BRADNER†
As Internet-connected devices become ubiquitous, it remains an open question whether security—
or privacy—can or will scale, or whether a combination of perverse incentives, new problems,
and new impacts of old problems like “technical debt” amassing from products being rushed to
market before being fully vetted, will derail progress and exacerbate cyber insecurity. This Article
investigates contemporary approaches to Internet of Things (IoT) governance through an indepth comparative case study focusing on the European Union (EU) and the United States.
Particular attention is paid to the impact on IoT security of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) and the Network Information Security (NIS) Directive in the EU, and the
influence of the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework
(NIST CSF), with a focus on mitigating the risk of politically motivated attacks on civilians. We
analyze reform proposals and apply lessons from major prior Internet governance debates to
argue for a polycentric approach to improving IoT security and privacy in the transatlantic
context.

† Chair, IU-Bloomington Cybersecurity Program; Director, Ostrom Workshop Program on
Cybersecurity and Internet Governance; Associate Professor, Indiana University Kelley School of Business.
† Harvard University, retired.
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INTRODUCTION
There were more than 2.9 billion cyber attacks on Internet of Things (IoT)
devices in 2019, which works out to a 300-percent increase from 2018, resulting
in damages measured in the billions.1 Regardless of the specific number, such a
vast scale of Internet-connected devices opens up a host of both business
possibilities and security vulnerabilities. One such example of a potentially
dystopian IoT future came in 2016 when a distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack, which came to be known as the Mirai botnet,2 crashed servers managed
by Dyn, a leading tech firm that manages certain critical Internet services,
resulting in service disruptions. The botnet took advantage of IoT
vulnerabilities,3 but instead of a foreign nation state, it turned out that the
perpetrators were three college students trying to win at Minecraft.4 “They didn’t
realize the power they were unleashing,” according to FBI agent Bill Walton.5
“This was the Manhattan Project.”6
This episode highlights the myriad vulnerabilities underlying the Internet’s
architecture that politically motivated nation-states can leverage to achieve their
strategic ends, such as undermining trust in an adversary government by causing
civil unrest following a blackout.7 During the 2018 Black Hat cybersecurity
conference, for example, ninety-three percent of respondents “saw the future of
IoT not necessarily as something smarter, but more dangerous, as they predict
nation states will target or exploit connected devices in droves over the coming
year.”8
The advent of Internet-connected vehicles and appliances has the capacity
to revolutionize business and society.9 But the vast majority of IoT devices are

1. Zak Doffman, Cyberattacks on IOT Devices Surge 300% in 2019, ‘Measured in Billions’, Report
Claims, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2019, 2:42 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/09/14/dangerouscyberattacks-on-iot-devices-up-300-in-2019-now-rampant-report-claims/#7771c6758926.
2. See Neena Kapur, The Rise of IoT Botnets, AM. SEC. PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2017),
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/the-rise-of-iot-botnets/ (“A bot is defined as a computer or internetconnected device that is infected with malware and controlled by a central command-and-control (C2) server. A
botnet is the term used for all devices controlled by the C2 server, and they can be used to carry out large scale
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against websites, resulting in an overload of traffic on the website
that renders it unusable.”).
3. See Daniel Burrus, The Internet of Things Is Far Bigger Than Anyone Realizes, WIRED,
https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); Lawrence J.
Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341, 347–48 (2015).
4. Garrett M. Graff, How a Dorm Room Minecraft Scam Brought Down the Internet, WIRED (Dec. 13,
2017, 3:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/mirai-botnet-minecraft-scam-brought-down-the-internet/.
5. Id.
6. Id. This episode is analyzed in greater detail in SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, THE INTERNET OF THINGS:
WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2020).
7. See Charlie Osborne, The Future of IoT? State-Sponsored Attacks, Say Security Professionals, ZDNET
(Aug. 13, 2018, 7:15 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-future-of-iot-state-sponsored-attacks-saysecurity-professionals/.
8. Id.
9. See Chris Welch, Tesla’s Model S Will Add Self-Driving ‘Autopilot’ Mode in Three Months, VERGE
(Mar. 19, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/3/19/8257933/tesla-model-s-autopilot-release-date.
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far smaller and cheaper—security cameras, baby monitors, kids’ toys, doorbells,
and even devices implanted in our own bodies, along with building controls,
down to individual light bulbs. However, it remains unclear whether security—
and privacy—can or will scale along with this increasingly crowded and
interconnected marketplace or whether a combination of perverse incentives,
increasing complexity, and new impacts of old problems like the “technical
debt” amassing from products being rushed to market, or simple ignorance of
security fundamentals on the part of manufactures or users, will derail progress
and exacerbate prevalent cyber insecurity.10 This is a particular problem for
governments seeking to protect vulnerable IoT devices and networks in an array
of critical infrastructure contexts, including healthcare and the electric grid, from
foreign exploitation.11
The Mirai botnet episode noted above highlights the complexities involved
in managing the multi-faceted cyber threat facing the public and private sectors.
IoT botnets are concerning given that they provide state and non-state actors
alike—including cybercriminals, politically motivated hacktivists, kids playing
around, and nation-states12—asymmetric capabilities that can be used to target
intellectual property and critical infrastructure. An array of public-private
efforts, such as the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST)
Cybersecurity Framework, efforts by civil society, such as the Consumer
Reports Digital Standard, and national governments, such as the United
Kingdom’s Cyber Essentials Plus Certificate discussed in Parts II and III, are all
being pursued to help harden the IoT. But will they be enough? What are the
benefits and drawbacks of the various private and public IoT governance models
being pursued by the EU and United States?13 How much convergence is there
among approaches purporting to govern the IoT, and what does that portend for
the future of impacted industries and consumers, particularly given concerns
over deepening digital divides driven in part by debates over 5G deployment?14
This Article focuses on cybersecurity standards set by industry, national
governments, and international organizations, to make networks and networkconnected devices more secure against hackers in general and, in particular,
against politically motivated attacks by foreign governments, or their proxies.
10. This is an industry term for the legacy costs of rolling out new products without first improving
security. See Taylor Armerding, What Is Security Debt, and How Do I Get Out of It?, SYNOPSYS (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.synopsys.com/blogs/software-security/security-debt/; see also Technical Debt, TECHOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/27913/technical-debt (Mar. 20, 2017).
11. See Osborne, supra note 7.
12. Jason Kornwitz, Why Politically Motivated Cyberattacks Might Be the New Normal, PHYS.ORG (June
30, 2017), https://phys.org/news/2017-06-politically-cyberattacks.html (“[W]e’ll ‘certainly see more and more
nation-state malware cropping up as cyberspace becomes more militarized as a way to achieve geopolitical
goals.’”).
13. China is another important epicenter for IoT governance but is not analyzed here due to space
constraints. See, e.g., Pan Qi, China IoT Standards to Go Global, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 4, 2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/jiangsu/wuxi/2018-01/04/content_35441064.htm.
14. See, e.g., Jeff John Roberts, The Splinternet Is Growing, FORTUNE (May 29, 2019, 3:30 AM),
https://fortune.com/2019/05/29/splinternet-online-censorship/.
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Such issues are at the forefront of both international business and geopolitics,
with escalating tensions between the United States and Iran being a case in point
of the stakes and vulnerabilities involved.15 We investigate contemporary
approaches to IoT security through an in-depth comparative case study focusing
on the European Union (EU) and the United States, the first time that this has
been attempted in the literature from a national security perspective.16 Particular
attention is paid to the impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and the Network Information Security (NIS) Directive in the EU, the influence
of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and other leading technical standards
and risk management strategies like cyber risk insurance, with a focus on
mitigating the risk of politically motivated attacks.17 We analyze transatlantic
reform proposals and apply lessons from major Internet governance debates to
argue for a polycentric approach to boosting IoT securing across both
jurisdictions.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I introduces the topic with a brief
history of the Internet of Things before moving on to reviewing prominent
technical vulnerabilities and use cases, the argument over whether there is
currently a market failure in the IoT context, and what role cyber risk insurance
may play in mitigating it. Part II then focuses on the U.S. approach to IoT
governance, paying particular attention to the federal regulatory landscape and
relevant state initiatives along with the role played by civil society. Part III then
analyzes EU efforts at IoT cybersecurity in some detail, paying particular
attention to GDPR and including a national case study in the form of the United
Kingdom (UK) and the impact of Brexit on its cybersecurity efforts. Part IV then
15. Cf. Jacquelyn Schneider, It’s Time to Calibrate Fears of a Cyberwar with Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/opinion/iran-cyber-attack-hacking.html (making the case that
large-scale cyber attacks on the United States from Iran are more difficult than is often reported).
16. Cf. Jane E. Kirtley & Scott Memmel, Rewriting the “Book of the Machine”: Regulatory and Liability
Issues for the Internet of Things, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 455, 458–59 (2019) (surveying the field of IoT
security with a focus on liability); Jenna Lindqvist, New Challenges to Personal Data Processing Agreements:
Is the GDPR Fit to Deal with Contract, Accountability and Liability in a World of the Internet of Things?, 26
INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 45, 59–61 (2018) (surveying GDPR as it applies to IoT governance with a particular
focus on liability); Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal Issues for Business,
43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 68 (2016) (offering a speculative account of the impact of GDPR on IoT governance);
Michael L. Rustad, How the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation Will Protect Consumers Using Smart
Devices, 52 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 227, 244 (2019) (focusing on the impact of GDPR on consumer-focused IoT
cybersecurity from an EU perspective); Jeremy Siegel, When the Internet of Things Flounders: Looking into
GDPR-esque Security Standards for IoT Devices in the United States from the Consumers’ Perspective, 20 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 189, 194–95 (2020) (analyzing how GDPR would apply to IoT cybersecurity in the U.S. context);
Charlotte A. Tschider, Regulating the Internet of Things: Discrimination, Privacy, and Cybersecurity in the
Artificial Intelligence Age, 96 DENV. L. REV. 87, 130–31 (2019) (taking a high-level view of IoT governance
with an emphasis on the emerging role of AI).
17. Of particulate note is the July 16, 2020 ruling from the European Court of Justice that found Privacy
Shield unconstitutional, impacting the transatlantic data governance regime but upholding standard contractual
clauses. As of this writing, the European Commission and the U.S. Department of Commerce have begun a new
round of negotiation to replace Privacy Shield with a new regime consistent with the July 2020 ECJ ruling.
Natasha Lomas, EU-US Privacy Shield Is Dead. Long Live Privacy Shield, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 11, 2020, 2:21
AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/11/eu-us-privacy-shield-is-dead-long-live-privacy-shield/.
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summarizes policy implications both by applying lessons from the case studies
to create an original spectrum of IoT governance by relying on lessons from the
field of polycentric governance, and also taking lessons from the history of
Internet governance and applying them to hot topics in IoT security including
the emerging norm of cybersecurity due diligence.

I. WELCOME TO THE INTERNET OF EVERYTHING
It remains unclear where exactly the term “Internet of Things” (IoT)
originated,18 though it is without question that the term today is widely used to
refer generally to a host of efforts to make our governments, businesses, and
even our bodies, increasingly interconnected and hence, to some degree,
“smart.”19 It features a wide range of products that “can be monitored,
controlled[,] and linked”20 together. Yet the positive press from such devices can
hide their direct and indirect costs,21 including the possibility of using them in
situations of domestic abuse.22 Moreover, public awareness of IoT remains low.
One survey, for example, found that only twenty-five percent of respondents
could define the “Internet of Things.”23 The decision to purchase a smart speaker
or doorbell, for example, is rarely situated as part of a larger framework about
the vulnerabilities it could introduce both personally, as well as in the wider
community, similar to how many of us do not connect the use of disposable bags,
or mining bitcoin, to marine or air pollution.24 And for those who are in the
trenches, it is not uncommon for “cyber fatigue” to set in. James Lewis of the
Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, has said, “[w]e have
a faith-based approach [to cybersecurity], in that we pray every night that

18. Kevin Ashton, That ‘Internet of Things’ Thing, RFID J. (June 22, 2009),
www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986.
19. See, e.g., Meghan Neal, The Internet of Bodies Is Coming, and You Could Get Hacked, VICE (Mar. 13,
2014, 11:20 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/gvyqgm/the-internet-of-bodies-is-coming-and-you-couldget-hacked; Hung LeHong & Jackie Fenn, Hype Cycle for Emerging Technologies, 2011, GARTNER (July 28,
2011), https://www.gartner.com/doc/1754719/.
20. Bonnie Cha, A Beginner’s Guide to Understanding the Internet of Things, VOX (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/1/15/11557782/a-beginners-guide-to-understanding-the-internet-of-things.
21. See Aaron Tilley, How Hackers Could Use a Nest Thermostat as an Entry Point into Your Home,
FORBES (Mar. 6, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2015/03/06/nest-thermostat-hackhome-network/#235d0d693986; Carl Franzen, How to Find a Hack-Proof Baby Monitor, LIFEHACKER (Aug. 4,
2017, 6:30 PM), https://offspring.lifehacker.com/how-to-find-a-hack-proof-baby-monitor-1797534985; Charlie
Osborne, Smartwatch Security Fails to Impress: Top Devices Vulnerable to Cyberattack, ZDNET (July 22, 2015,
10:25 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/smartwatch-security-fails-to-impress-top-devices-vulnerable-tocyberattack/; John Markoff, Why Light Bulbs May Be the Next Hacker Target, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/technology/why-light-bulbs-may-be-the-next-hacker-target.html.
22. See Nellie Bowles, Thermostats, Locks and Lights: Digital Tools of Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/23/technology/smart-home-devices-domestic-abuse.html.
23. Infographic: IoT Awareness Is Low but Adoption Continues to Grow, IOT TIMES (June 20, 2019),
https://iot.eetimes.com/infographic-iot-awareness-is-low-but-adoption-continues-to-grow/.
24. See IoT Is Coming Even if the Security Isn’t Ready: Here’s What to Do, WIRED,
https://www.wired.com/brandlab/2017/06/iot-is-coming-even-if-the-security-isnt-ready-heres-what-to-do/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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nothing bad will happen.”25 In short, managing the growth of IoT impacts a
diverse set of interests from national security to economic competitiveness,
sustainable development, and trust in the digital age. How did we get here?
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The notion of deploying and leveraging the power of smart devices has
been a goal decades in the making. Such “intelligent” devices were envisioned
as far back as the 1950s and 1960s.26 This trend continued during the creation of
ARPANET, an undertaking that eventually became what we refer to as the
Internet, under the heading of “pervasive computing.”27 For example, CarnegieMellon University researchers in the 1980s deployed sensors in a vending
machine.28 By the 1990s, even though the Internet was increasingly global, slow
connection speeds held back IoT devices and services.29
The potential of IoT tech has arguably only been realized since 2010,30 the
result of the confluence of at least three factors: (1) the widespread availability
of always-on high-speed Internet connectivity in many parts of the world; (2)
faster computational capabilities permitting the real-time analysis of Big Data;
and (3) economies of scale lowering the cost of sensors and chips to
manufacturers.31 However, the rapid rollout of IoT technologies has not been
accompanied by any mitigation of the array of technical vulnerabilities across
these devices, which are introduced next.
B. TECHNICAL VULNERABILITIES AND USE CASES
As has often been observed, the Internet was not designed with security in
mind.32 Access to the early ARPANET was restricted to government-funded
25. Ken Dilanian, Privacy Group Sues to Get Records About NSA-Google Relationship, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
14, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-sep-14-la-fi-nsa-google-20100914story.html.
26. See NILS J. NILSSON, THE QUEST FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND
ACHIEVEMENTS 71 (2010).
27. LeHong & Fenn, supra note 19.
28. The Internet of Things: Groundbreaking Tech with Security Risks, WELIVESECURITY (Oct. 29, 2015,
12:49 PM), http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/10/29/internet-things-groundbreaking-tech-security-risks/
(“Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University first came up with an internet-connected Coke vending machine
in 1982.”).
29. See, e.g., Steve Ranger, What Is the IoT? Everything You Need to Know About the Internet of Things
Right Now, ZDNET (Feb. 3, 2020, 6:45 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/what-is-the-internet-of-thingseverything-you-need-to-know-about-the-iot-right-now/.
30. See Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things’, FORBES (May 13, 2014, 12:05
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyonecan-understand/.
31. See JIM CHASE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET OF THINGS, TEX. INSTRUMENTS (2013),
www.ti.com/lit/ml/swrb028/swrb028.pdf; Scott J. Shackelford, Anjanette Raymond, Danuvasin Charoen,
Rakshana Balakrishnan, Prakhar Dixit, Julianna Gjonaj, & Rachith Kavi, When Toasters Attack: A Polycentric
Approach to Enhancing the “Security of Things”, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 415, 422 (2017).
32. Craig
Timberg,
A Flaw
in
the Design, WASH. POST
(May
30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/05/30/net-of-insecurity-part-1/.
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researchers and, even after more than a decade, fewer than a thousand computers
were connected to it.33 With a limited and controlled set of users, security was
not considered an important issue. Thus, the underlying architecture and
protocols of the Internet do not have security “built-in.”34
Because the network itself does not provide adequate security protections,
security is left to the devices connected to the network, which are often not up
to the task. This includes toasters, which in many ways have become the
quintessential example of an Internet-connected device that, perhaps, should not
be.35 Former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, for example, has
warned about the vulnerabilities in various IoT devices, including toasters, to be
utilized by intelligence agencies around the world to aid surveillance efforts.36
Too many device or software vendors have been slow to understand that it is the
vendor’s job to provide security in the systems they sell. For example, it was not
until early 2002 that Microsoft, the primary vendor of operating system software
for Internet-connected devices, made security a primary goal.37 To this day, far
too many medical devices have inadequate security.38 Industrial controllers are
often vulnerable because vendors incorrectly assumed they would only be used
on isolated networks, not the Internet.39 Too many IoT toys and devices, such as
security cameras and baby monitors, have fixed and unchangeable access
passwords which, when (not if) discovered, open the devices to exploitation.40
This is now easily done by making use of websites such as Shodan, which can
allow anyone (hackers and defenders alike) to search for IoT devices connected
to the Internet.41 Many IoT devices are built using embedded computing
modules that were programmed by component manufacturers who,
33. Robert H. Zakon, Hobbes’ Internet Timeline, ZAKON, https://www.zakon.org/robert/internet/timeline/
(Jan. 1, 2018).
34. Timberg, supra note 32.
35. See Alex Hern & Arwa Mahdawi, Beware the Smart Toaster: 18 Tips for Surviving the Surveillance
Age, GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/28/beware-the-smarttoaster-18-tips-for-surviving-the-surveillance-age.
36. See Steve Ranger, Yes, Your Smart Toaster Really Will Be Spying on You for the Government, ZDNET
(Feb. 12, 2016, 4:47 PM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/yes-your-smart-toaster-really-will-be-spying-on-youfor-the-government/ (“In the future, intelligence services might use the IoT for identification, surveillance,
monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.”).
37. Bill Gates, Bill Gates: Trustworthy Computing, WIRED (Jan. 17, 2002, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2002/01/bill-gates-trustworthy-computing/.
38. Lily Hay Newman, Medical Devices Are the Next Security Nightmare, WIRED (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:30
AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-nightmare/; Scott J. Shackelford, Michael
Mattioli, Steve Myers, Austin Brady, Yvette Wang, & Stephanie Wong, Securing the Internet of Healthcare, 19
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 405 (2018); Kelly Sheridan, Severe Vulnerabilities Discovered in GE Medical Devices,
DARK READING (Jan. 23, 2020, 1:40 PM), https://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/severevulnerabilities-discovered-in-ge-medical-devices/d/d-id/1336867.
39. Robert Abel, Researchers Find 147 Vulnerabilities in 34 SCADA Mobile Applications, SC MEDIA (Jan.
11, 2018), https://www.scmagazine.com/the-top-security-weaknesses-were-code-tampering-flaws-which-werefound-in-94-percent-of-apps/article/736656/.
40. Anna Bryk, IoT Toys: A New Vector for Cyber Attacks, APRIORIT (Feb. 2, 2018, 7:18 PM),
https://www.apriorit.com/dev-blog/521-iot-toy-attacks.
41. See SHODAN, https://www.shodan.io/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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demonstrably, have little to no security expertise.42 Moreover, even more
sophisticated firms have run into trouble. Amazon’s Ring smart doorbell, for
example, has been the subject of a federal class action investigation after
breaches due to alleged lax security such as a lack of multi-factor
authentication.43 This begs the question of whether or not there is a market
failure when it comes to IoT security.
C. AN IOT MARKET FAILURE?
Debates have played out for years over whether or not there is a market
failure in the cybersecurity context generally, or in IoT specifically.44 Market
failures occur when price mechanisms fail to take account of the relevant “costs
and benefits necessary to provide and consume a good,”45 such as when the stock
prices of firms are not negatively impacted following a data breach even as their
customers and employees suffer.46 Relatedly, as applied to IoT, Yosef
Yudborovsky has argued, “[t]he security failure at the heart of IoT is a product
of the lack of incentives owners see in defining the software to provide its
maximum security.”47 In short, such a limited perspective can result not only in
more frequent exploitations and data breaches, but also in perpetuating identity
theft and potentially exacerbating national security concerns. A future could play
out wherein some consumers who can afford the added cost are able to enjoy the
benefits of more secure (and thereby private) devices, whereas others who are
less well-off are forced to rely on insecure products.
There are important ethical and legal implications of such an IoT market
failure worth exploring. For example, under a utilitarian framing, the costs to
society generally are high in a hyper-connected IoT ecosystem powering a
surveillance economy in which a reasonable expectation of personal privacy
becomes technically impossible, in either public or private settings.48 There are
42. Darren Allan, Dangerous Backdoor Exploit Found on Popular IoT Devices, TECHRADAR (Mar. 2,
2017), https://www.techradar.com/news/dangerous-backdoor-exploit-found-on-popular-iot-devices.
43. E.g., Amazon’s Ring Slammed with Federal Lawsuit, CISO MAG. (Dec. 30, 2019),
https://www.cisomag.com/amazons-ring-slammed-with-federal-lawsuit/ (“According to researchers, the
vulnerability stems from when the Ring smartphone app sends the wireless network connections to the Amazon
Ring servers in the cloud. It’s found that this process is taking place in an insecure manner, which can be
exploited by an attacker.”).
44. See Eli Dourado, Is There a Cybersecurity Market Failure? 19–33 (George Mason Univ. Mercatus
Ctr., Working Paper No. 12-05, 2012), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Cybersecurity_Dourado_
WP1205_0.pdf (arguing that market failures are not so common in the cybersecurity realm); Jerry Brito & Tate
Watkins, Loving the Cyber Bomb? The Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, 3 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 39, 82 (2011) (making the case against there being a cybersecurity market failure).
45. Introducing Market Failure, LUMEN LEARNING: BOUNDLESS ECON., https://courses.lumen
learning.com/boundless-economics/chapter/introducing-market-failure/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
46. See Shinichi Kamiya, Jun-Koo Kang, Jungmin Kim, Andreas Milidonis & René M. Stulz, What Is the
Impact of Successful Cyberattacks on Target Firms? 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24409,
2018), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w24409/w24409.pdf.
47. Yosef Yudborovsky, The Failure in the Market for the Internet of Things, MEDIUM (June 27, 2017),
https://medium.com/@yoss202/the-failure-in-the-market-for-internet-of-things-cff948f571b9.
48. SHACKELFORD, supra note 6, at ch. 4.
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several ways to leverage the market to avoid such an Orwellian outcome, some
of which are explored in Parts II through IV. For example, civil society may be
leveraged to better inform consumers about the security traits of the products
they are considering (such as the Consumer Reports Digital Standard). IoT
trustmarks and certification schemes may be utilized to a similar end. IoT
product manufacturers may also be compelled to internalize the costs of their
insecure products, as seen in California and the EU.49 More generally, firms
could recognize IoT security not only as a necessary cost of doing business, but
as a corporate social responsibility.50
Regrettably, we shall see the U.S. government has been slow to address the
situation despite occasional calls for a “shared responsibility” in promoting
cybersecurity.51 As a result, these devices have been left open to exploitation,
necessitating a new approach to IoT governance that would include a role for
insurance as part of a larger polycentric approach to securing IoT.
D. CONSIDERING A ROLE FOR INSURANCE
Interconnected devices have the potential to drive numerous new
businesses, and even industries, but they also contribute to our collective cyber
insecurity. An increasingly popular tool to help mitigate the risk of cyber attacks
is insurance, with total global premiums being on the order of $20 billion by
2025.52 The value of the U.S. market alone for cyber risk insurance is expected
to surpass $3 billion by 2025, with more than 40% of small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), and greater than 60% of large enterprises, having cyber risk
coverage in 2019.53 Target, for example, was able to recover $44 million from
its insurance carrier following its massive data breach in 2013–2014.54 Indeed,
a growing number of public sector stakeholders—including local governments
and even state agencies—are purchasing cyber risk insurance policies to help
mitigate the risks they face.55
However, there are myriad problems associated with cyber attacks that
insurance is either ill-suited or unable to help manage. For example, it has long
been the case that it is difficult to purchase insurance coverage for trade secrets,
impacts on brand or reputation following a data breach, or other hard-to-quantify
49. See infra Parts II–IV.
50. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort & Danuvasin Charoen, Sustainable
Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
1995 (2016).
51. Rand Beers, Cybersecurity: A Shared Responsibility, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 18, 2013, 1:33 PM),
https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2013/10/18/cybersecurity-shared-responsibility.
52. Jennifer Rudden, Cyber Insurance—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Sept. 24, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/topics/2445/cyber-insurance/.
53. Id.
54. Dhanya Skariachan & Jim Finkle, Target’s Cyber Insurance Softens Blow of Massive Credit Breach,
INS. J. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2014/02/26/321638.htm.
55. See, e.g., Scott Ikeda, Cyber Insurance Now Critical for Public Sector Agencies?, CPO MAG. (Nov.
29, 2017), https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/cyber-insurance-now-critical-public-sector-agencies/.

February 2021]

HAVE YOU UPDATED YOUR TOASTER?

637

costs.56 This fact is problematic given that the vast majority of the firms
comprising the S&P 500 are tied up in intangible assets, namely intellectual
property.57 Moreover, numerous organizations that think they are covered for a
given cyber incident have found out otherwise in the aftermath of a breach given
how these policies can be written with exclusions for various first- and thirdparty losses, not to mention acts of cyber war and terrorism.58 For the latter, as
of this writing Maersk is litigating with its insurance carrier over whether or not
the $1.3 billion in losses it sustained in June 2017 is covered by its insurance
policy given that it was likely Russia’s military intelligence agency behind the
breach.59 This facet of many existing policies limits the utility of cyber risk
insurance to help mitigate the risk of politically motivated cyber attacks utilizing
IoT vulnerabilities.
Indeed, IoT is challenging for cyber risk insurance providers on several
fronts, including the fact of how difficult it is to quantify the risk given how
many of these smart products lack “even basic . . . security features . . . such as
updates and patches.”60 Adding this to the fact that cyber attacks on IoT devices,
such as pacemakers or furnaces, can have real-world and even life-threatening
impacts means that more people, and organizations, will see this as vital to
mitigating cyber risks.61 However, building actuarial tables to better understand
the IoT cyber threat landscape is no simple matter given the relative lack of
verifiable data.62 Clearly, then, IoT cyber risk insurance coverage will be an
increasingly popular, if still incomplete and problematic, component of a
polycentric approach to managing the full range of cyber threats threating
individuals, organizations, and nations.
E. A POLYCENTRIC APPROACH TO SECURING IOT
Of the many ways to consider cybersecurity policy in the IoT context,
among the most potentially helpful is arguably polycentric governance. As has

56. See, e.g., Christine Marciano, Trade Secrets Are Not Covered by Cyber Insurance, DATA BREACH INS.
(Feb. 21, 2013), https://databreachinsurancequote.com/cyber-insurance/trade-secrets-are-not-covered-by-cyberinsurance/.
57. See Bruce Berman, $21 Trillion in U.S. Intangible Assets Is 84% of S&P 500 Value—IP Rights and
Reputation Included, IP CLOSEUP (June 4, 2019), https://ipcloseup.com/2019/06/04/21-trillion-in-u-sintangible-asset-value-is-84-of-sp-500-value-ip-rights-and-reputation-included/.
58. See Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Risky Business: Lessons for Mitigating Cyber Attacks from
the International Insurance Law on Piracy, 24 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1–3 (2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Should
Your Firm Invest in Cyber Risk Insurance?, 55 BUS. HORIZONS 349, 353–54 (2012).
59. See Riley Griffin, Katherine Chiglinsky & David Voreacos, Was It an Act of War? That’s Merck Cyber
Attack’s $1.3 Billion Insurance Question, INS. J. (Dec. 3, 2019), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2019/12/03/550039.htm (noting that the real targets behind NotPetya were in Ukraine and Maersk
was “collateral damage”).
60. MARSH & MCLENNON COS., THE INTERNET OF EVERYTHING: BUILDING CYBER RESILIENCE IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 2 (2018), https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/building-cyber-resilience-in-aconnected-world.html (select “view full article”).
61. See id. at 3–5.
62. See Doffman, supra note 1.
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been previously argued, this framework “is a multi-level, multi-purpose, multifunctional, and multi-sectoral model”63 that “challenges orthodoxy [in part] by
demonstrating the benefits of self-organization [and] networking regulations ‘at
multiple scales.’”64 Polycentricity also argues for a set of nested stakeholders
rather than “a single governmental unit,” which is often unable to address
“global collective action problems”65 such as cyber-attacks in the IoT context.
This approach, in other words, “recognizes both the common but differentiated
responsibilities of public- and private-sector stakeholders as well as the potential
for best practices to be identified and spread organically, generating positive
network effects that could, in time, result in the emergence of a cascade toward
a cybersecurity due diligence norm.”66
Elinor Ostrom’s seminal book Governing the Commons offered a series of
eight design principles distilled from her extensive fieldwork for the effective
management of common pool resources (CPRs).67 IoT security has been equated
to a CPR problem,68 and if true, Ostrom’s principles69 may prove helpful in
making predictions about the governance of various regimes under differing
scenarios. These include the importance of: (1) “clearly defined boundaries for
the user pool . . . and the resource domain”;70 (2) “[p]roportional equivalence
between benefits and costs”;71 (3) “[c]ollective choice arrangements” ensuring
“that the resource users participate in setting . . . rules”;72 (4)
“[m]onitoring . . . by the appropriators or by their agents”;73 (5) “[g]raduated
63. Scott J. Shackelford, The Law of Cyber Peace, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2017) (citing Michael D.
McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex
Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 169, 171–72 (2011) (“Polycentricity is a system of governance in which
authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under
which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well
as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes.”).
64. Id. (quoting Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action
Problems 1 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Pol. Theory and Pol’y Analysis & Ariz. State Univ. Ctr. for the Study of
Inst. Diversity, Working Paper No. 08-6, 2008), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/
10535/4417/W08-6_Ostrom_DLC.pdf?sequence=1).
65. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 35 (Dev. & Econ. Rsch. Grp.,
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/9034/WPS5095_WDR2010_0021.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
66. Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International Law on
Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 47 (2016)
(citing Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L
ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998)). For a deeper dive on this topic, see chapter 2 of SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING
CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE (2014).
67. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 90 (1990); see also SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 5 (1998).
68. See Isaac Kohen, Why IoT Device Security Is a Common Pool Resource, IOT WORLD TODAY (Apr. 9,
2018), https://www.iotworldtoday.com/2018/04/09/why-iot-device-security-common-pool-resource/.
69. See Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic
Systems, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 8, 2009), in 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 653 (2010).
70. BUCK, supra note 67, at 32.
71. Ostrom, supra note 64, at 13.
72. BUCK, supra note 67, at 32.
73. Id.
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sanctions” for rule violators;74 (6) “[c]onflict-resolution mechanisms [that] are
readily available, low cost, and legitimate”;75 (7) “[m]inimal recognition of
rights to organize”;76 and (8) “governance activities [being] organized in
multiple layers of nested enterprises.”77
It should be apparent that not all of Professor Ostrom’s design principles
are equally applicable in the IoT context. For example, boundaries in the IoT
context are relatively fluid depending on the governance level at issue, and thus
may be difficult to draw and enforce.78 Another instance is Professor Ostrom’s
third design principle, which states “that most of the individuals affected by a
resource regime are authorized to participate in making and modifying the rules
related to boundaries, assessment of costs . . . etc.”79 This principle calls for
proactive rulemaking by various stakeholders, including technical
communities.80 The history of Internet governance has been marked by such a
multi-stakeholder approach to governance, as is discussed further in Part IV.
Moreover, this principle recognizes the need for dynamic rules that keep pace
with a changing regulatory and technological environment.81 One example of
this practice being manifest has been the rollout and wide adoption of the NIST
CSF, which is helping to establish a baseline of cybersecurity due diligence from
the bottom up both in the United States and around the world.82
Other theorists have also pioneered work relevant to this discussion, which
has been discussed at length in previous works but is worth introducing here.83
Professor Yochai Benkler, for example, conceptualized a three-layer structure
of cyberspace, including: (1) the “physical infrastructure,” including the routers
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of Organizations, in
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES IN BUILDING GOVERNANCE
MECHANISMS 105, 118 tbl.5.3 (Eric Brousseau, Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Pierre-André Jouvet & Marc Willinger
eds., 2012).
77. Id.
78. See ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE
ENVIRONMENT 164 (2007) (explaining how members of micro-communities tend to focus only on what directly
impacts their own activities).
79. Ostrom, supra note 76, at 120.
80. See George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS.
L.J. 641, 656–57 (2010) (discussing the origins of the proactive law movement, which may be considered “a
future-oriented approach to law placing an emphasis on legal knowledge to be applied before things go wrong”
(quoting NORDIC SCHOOL OF PROACTIVE LAW, http://www.juridicum.su.se/proactivelaw/main/)).
81. Ostrom, supra note 76, at 120.
82. See Scott J. Shackelford, Andrew A. Proia, Brenton Martell & Amanda N. Craig, Toward a Global
Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on
Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 309–10
(2015); Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell, & Jeffrey Haut, Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary”
Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217, 219, 222–23 (2016) [hereinafter Shackelford et al.,
Bottoms Up].
83. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks Through Polycentric
Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273 (2013) (discussing the different governance models proposed by theorists
and their security implications).
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and smart devices that comprise the physical aspect of cyberspace and IoT; (2)
the “logical infrastructure,” including the TCP/IP protocol; and (3) the “content
layer,” which incorporates data and, indirectly, users.84 This model is similar to
Professor Lawrence Lessig’s model from his 1999 book on how code becomes
law,85 which also advocated for protecting openness and “decentralized
innovation.”86 However, Professor Andrew Murray has criticized this approach
as being too “idealistic,” stating that “the harnessing of one regulatory modality
through the application of another is more likely to lead to further regulatory
competition, due to the complexity of the network environment.”87 Instead of a
single approach, though, Professor Lessig identified four modalities of cyber
regulation: architecture, law, the market, and norms that “may be used
individually or collectively” by policymakers seeking to enhance IoT security.88
The following Part digs more deeply into how two principal cyber
powers—the United States and the EU—have leveraged these modalities to
address latent IoT insecurity. As will be apparent, despite having much in
common, these two jurisdictions have addressed IoT governance quite
differently, with the EU preferring a more comprehensive, regulatory approach
as compared to the more sector-specific, standards-based U.S. approach. Still,
both regimes have similarities, which can be leveraged to help build momentum
toward new international cybersecurity due diligence norms focused on securing
smart devices.

II. U.S. CASE STUDY
The United States, long a pioneer in Internet technologies and their
application, has increasingly focused on the promise and peril of IoT
technologies, including the ways in which they could be leveraged for politically
motivated hacking. This Part unpacks the current U.S. regulatory framework
pertaining to IoT devices before moving to analyze reform efforts at the state
and federal levels. We then discuss the utility of cybersecurity frameworks and
standards, focusing on those published by NIST and Consumer Reports, to better
understand whether these various modalities will be sufficient at helping to fill
prevailing governance gaps.

84. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structure of Regulation Toward
Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMMC’NS L.J. 561, 562 (2000).
85. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG,
FREE CULTURE: HOW B IG MEDIA USES T ECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 160 (2004) (describing “the interaction between architecture and law” in the context of copyright
regulation).
86. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 85
(2002).
87. MURRAY, supra note 78, at 46 (“It is highly unlikely that content producers, media corporations and
other copyright holders will allow for a neutral system designed to protect cultural property and creativity at the
cost of loss of control over their products.”).
88. Id. at 28.

February 2021]

HAVE YOU UPDATED YOUR TOASTER?

641

A. FEDERAL REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
As stated above, the United States has favored a generally voluntary,
sector-specific or topic-specific approach to both cybersecurity and data privacy.
This is unlike the mandatory and comprehensive approach, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), enacted in May 2018 in the EU, which came into
force in May 2018.89 In short, not all private data is created equal in the United
States: it matters whether it is health or financial data, or your IP address or
Internet searches (at least outside of California).90 The latter, for example, are
safeguarded by GDPR as personal data for EU citizens, but U.S. citizens do not
enjoy similar protections.91 Similarly, cybersecurity regulation in the United
States—particularly in the IoT context—includes a patchwork of federal and
state laws and policies, which are summarized below and compared in Part III
to the EU.92 In general, though, such protections are more robust in Europe than
in the United States, ranging from heightened requirements to disclose cyber
attacks to national authorities, cyber attack post-mortem requirements and
requirements to appoint a Data Protection Officer to enhanced consent
requirements, as discussed further below.93 Such standards would not protect
against all incidents of sophisticated foreign states targeting vulnerable
networks, but they do help to raise the overall level of cybersecurity due
diligence, as is discussed further in Part IV.
Due to both the scope and complexity inherent in the IoT, federal
cybersecurity law has so far not been up to the task of mitigating security
problems arising in this context.94 Governance gaps remain common, despite the
best efforts by groups such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which
encourages, but does not require, firms to:
1. [B]uild security into devices at the outset, rather than as an afterthought in
the design process;
2. [T]rain employees about the importance of security, and ensure that
security is managed at an appropriate level in the organization;

89. See, e.g., Meghna Chakrabarti, Overhauling Digital Privacy in the EU, NPR: ON POINT,
http://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2018/04/24/eu-gdpr-facebook-digital-privacy (Apr. 24, 2018).
90. See David Zetoony, CCPA Privacy and Security FAQs: If a Company Receives a Right to Be Forgotten
Request, Does It Have to Delete the Requestor’s IP Address from Its Weblogs?, JD SUPRA (Oct. 24, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ccpa-privacy-and-security-faqs-if-a-28543/ (explaining that it is an open
question whether IP addresses are indeed covered).
91. See What Is Personal Data?, EU GDPR COMPLIANT, https://eugdprcompliant.com/personal-data/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
92. See Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection.
93. Id.
94. See FTC Report on Internet of Things Urges Companies to Adopt Best Practices to Address Consumer
Privacy and Security Risks, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/01/ftc-report-internet-things-urges-companies-adopt-best-practices.
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3. [E]nsure that when outside service providers are hired, that those providers
are capable of maintaining reasonable security, and provide reasonable
oversight of the providers;
4. [W]hen a security risk is identified, consider a “defense-in-depth” strategy
whereby multiple layers of security may be used to defend against a
particular risk;
5. [C]onsider measures to keep unauthorized users from accessing a
consumer’s device, data, or personal information stored on the network;
6. [M]onitor connected devices throughout their expected life cycle, and
where feasible, provide security patches to cover known risks.95

In sum, the FTC recommends “tackling data security and all consumerfacing software development efforts with a holistic approach that incorporates a
‘privacy by design’ strategy to address the entire life cycle of data collection,
use, access, storage and ultimately secure data deletion.”96 These suggestions
are in line with both the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the 2015
NIST IoT Framework discussed next. They help to address the problem of
politically motivated cyber attacks on IoT networks because they help to raise
the overall level of cybersecurity due diligence, including for defense
contractors, promoting defense-in-depth. 97
The FTC has authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act to protect consumers from “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”98 Over
time, the FTC has engaged in enforcement actions against firms with inadequate
cybersecurity safeguards, particularly those operating in a critical infrastructure
context. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the FTC’s
authority to regulate cybersecurity in 2015.99 However, based on a more recent
case, LabMD Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,100 the FTC is being pushed to
become more specific with regards to the cybersecurity standards it requires of
covered U.S. businesses. In essence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, to be consistent with the reference to the Third Circuit, ruled in June
2018 that, since the FTC had not provided specific cybersecurity standards

95. Id.
96. Richard Santalesa, FTC Enters “Internet of Things” Arena with TRENDnet Proposed Settlement,
INFOLAWGROUP (Sept. 9, 2013), https://web.archive.org/web/20130917003715/https://www.infolaw
group.com/2013/09/articles/ftc/trendnet-settlement/.
97. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM
CYBERSECURITY WITH DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH STRATEGIES (2016), https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/
recommended_practices/NCCIC_ICS-CERT_Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf.
98. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking
Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority (last visited
Feb. 4, 2021) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)).
99. W. Reece Hirsch, Rahul Kapoor, & Shokoh H. Yaghoubi, Third Circuit Sides with FTC in Data
Security Dispute with Wyndham, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 8, 2015), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/thirdcircuit-sides-ftc-data-security-dispute-wyndham; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,
799 F.3d 236, 259 (3d Cir. 2015).
100. LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 678 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2016).
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defining reasonableness for LabMD, a now bankrupt cancer-screening
company, the FTC’s order was illegal.101
While not challenging the FTC’s authority to police cybersecurity, the
court did significantly tighten the grounds over which the FTC could initiate
investigations and levy fines and settlement orders. Specifically, the underlying
data breach must violate some specific law such as the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA).102 Thus, the FTC cannot
penalize a company for the release of data causing a substantial consumer injury
if it is not subject to an existing law. The Eleventh Circuit did not address
whether the FTC’s use of the negligence tort sufficed in this case. The FTC
argued that “its enforcement action was grounded in the common law of
negligence because LabMD unintentionally allowed the invasion of its
customers’ privacy.”103 To be clear, even though the Eleventh Circuit did not
rule on that question here, a consumer harmed would still be able to seek
damages under a negligence cause of action in common law, though that comes
with its own challenges such as the economic loss doctrine.104 In addition,
depending on where the person resides there could also be the option of statelevel relief. For example, California’s 2018 Consumer Privacy Act, now in
effect, is promoting higher standards for data use transparency.105 It does not go
as far as the EU’s GDPR discussed in Part III, but it does include provisions that
allow consumers to sue in the aftermath of data breaches including in the IoT
context.106 Moreover, as of January 2020, under California Senate Bill 327, “any
manufacturer of a device that connects ‘directly or indirectly’ to the Internet
must equip it with ‘reasonable’ security features, designed to prevent
unauthorized access, modification, or information disclosure.”107 Yet these laws
do little to regulate the importation of insecure IoT products from overseas,

101. Alison Frankel, There’s a Big Problem for the FTC Lurking in the 11th Circuit’s LabMD Data-Security
Ruling, REUTERS (June 7, 2018, 1:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-labmd/theres-a-big-problemfor-the-ftc-lurking-in-11th-circuits-labmd-data-security-ruling-idUSKCN1J32S2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in the
Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935, 936–38 (2016).
105. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.1 (2018); see also Devin
Coldewey, The California Consumer Privacy Act Officially Takes Effect Today, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 1, 2020,
6:01 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/01/the-california-consumer-privacy-act-officially-takes-effecttoday/.
106. See Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law with Implications for the Country, NPR
(June 29, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strict-internetprivacy-law-with-implications-for-the-country.
107. Adi Robertson, California Just Became the First State with an Internet of Things Cybersecurity Law,
VERGE (Sept. 28, 2018, 6:07 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/28/17874768/california-iot-smart-devicecybersecurity-bill-sb-327-signed-law; see also Lindsey O’Donnell, IoT Security Regulation Is on the Horizon,
THREAT POST (June 6, 2019, 8:44 AM), https://threatpost.com/iot-security-regulation-horizon/145406/ (noting
that the law requires “reasonable security feature or features that are appropriate to the nature and function of
the device”).
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which if enacted still would admittedly pose extraterritorial concerns of the kind
surrounding GDPR discussed below.
There currently seems to be a growing circuit split over the FTC’s
cybersecurity oversight powers focusing on the Third and Eleventh Circuits,
which could result in a state of affairs (unless Congress intervenes) in which no
U.S. federal government agency can penalize a company simply for having lax
cybersecurity unless it runs afoul of existing sector-specific statutory
prohibitions.108 Yet that does not mean that states could not act, as the California
example demonstrates, along with new public-private partnerships as called for
by applying the Ostrom Design Principles discussed further in Part IV.
B. ANALYZING THE NIST CSF
After being unable to convince Congress to pass comprehensive
cybersecurity reform legislation, the Obama administration instead decided on
an approach to nudge U.S. critical infrastructure toward greater cybersecurity
due diligence.109 The result was the first 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework
(NIST CSF), which is critical since—even though it has been criticized as
leading to a reactive stance110—it is promoting a baseline standard of care.111
The NIST CSF is designed to “help organizations identify, implement, and
improve cybersecurity practices, and create[] a common language for internal
and external communication of cybersecurity issues.”112 The first NIST CSF was
published in 2014,113 and not too long thereafter it became established as an
important data point for defining a “standard” for “due diligence.”114
Reminiscent of GDPR, the NIST CSF is also having a worldwide impact given
active NIST collaborations with more than twenty nations.115 Version 1.1 of the

108. See, e.g., Adam Mazmanian, Senate Bill Would Give FTC New Data Breach Authority, FCW (Jan. 10,
2018), https://fcw.com/articles/2018/01/10/ftc-data-breach-mazmanian.aspx.
109. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1 (2013), https://www.nist.gov/system/
files/documents/itl/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf.
110. Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework Receives Mixed Reviews, CSO (Jan.
31, 2014, 7:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/nist-s-finalized-cybersecurity-frameworkreceives-mixed-reviews.html.
111. See, e.g., Shackelford et al., Bottoms Up, supra note 82, at 308; Shackelford et al., supra note 66, at
27.
112. PWC, WHY YOU SHOULD ADOPT THE NIST FRAMEWORK 1 (2014), https://www.pwc.com/
us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publications/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf.
113. See NIST, FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY:
IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636, at 26 (2015), http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/
upload/cybersecurity_framework_bsi_2015-04-08.pdf (noting that “[t]o allow for adoption, Framework version
2.0 is not planned for the near term”).
114. John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary, PIVOT POINT SEC.,
https://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/blog/nist-cybersecurity-framework/#:~:text=Some%20of%20the%20
members%20in,they%20maintain%20are%20considered%20CI (May 25, 2017).
115. There is some evidence that this may already be happening, including with regards to the Federal Trade
Commission’s cybersecurity enforcement powers. See, e.g., Brian Fung, A Court Just Made It Easier for the
Government to Sue Companies for Getting Hacked, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2015, 2:03 PM),
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NIST CSF was published in 2018,116 which “boasts . . . improvements” in the
areas of “authentication, supply chain cybersecurity, and vulnerability
disclosure.”117 IoT has largely been left to the margins, which is a topic that
NIST is gearing up to address in more detail.
C. CASE FOR A NIST IOT FRAMEWORK
NIST put out a draft IoT Cybersecurity Baseline and is gathering feedback
on it as of this writing.118 Such a Baseline could be supplemented by the 2019
NIST Privacy Framework, which takes a similar approach to the NIST CSF as a
“tool developed in collaboration with stakeholders intended to help
organizations identify and manage privacy risk to build innovative products and
services while protecting individuals’ privacy.”119 Legislation that is currently
pending as of this writing, namely the IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of
2019 discussed next, would require NIST to finalize this process in collaboration
with the Office of Management and Budget.
D. UNPACKING THE PROPOSED FEDERAL IOT LEGISLATION
Another path forward aside from bottom-up cybersecurity and data privacy
frameworks facilitated by NIST is to rely more specifically on legislation to do
what, thus far, standards have failed to deliver, building on recent developments
of states like California. Senators Mark Warner, Cory Gardner, Ron Wyden, and
Steve Daines introduced the Internet of Things Cybersecurity Act of 2017 with
this aim in mind.120 In essence, the legislation would leverage U.S. government
procurement to only purchase products that: (1) “are patchable,” (2) do not
“contain known vulnerabilities,” (3) “rely on standard protocols,” and (4) they
“don’t contain hard-coded passwords.”121 Rather than a one-size-fits-all
approach to regulating IoT, the authors provide a mechanism allowing industry
to take up “equivalent, or more rigorous, device security requirements” than
those envisioned in the Act.122 Proponents of this effort include Bruce Schneier
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/08/24/a-court-just-made-it-easier-for-thegovernment-to-sue-companies-for-getting-hacked/.
116. NIST Releases Version 1.1 of Its Popular Cybersecurity Framework, NIST (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2018/04/nist-releases-version-11-its-popular-cybersecurityframework.
117. Scott J. Shackelford, Smart Factories, Dumb Policy? Managing Cybersecurity and Data Privacy Risks
in the Industrial Internet of Things, 21 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 1, 15 (2019).
118. See NIST Releases Draft Security Feature Recommendations for IoT Devices, NIST (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/08/nist-releases-draft-security-feature-recommendations-iotdevices.
119. Privacy Framework, NIST, https://www.nist.gov/privacy-framework (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
120. MARK WARNER, CORY GARDNER, ROB WYDEN, & STEVE DAINES, INTERNET OF THINGS
CYBERSECURITY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2017 FACT SHEET, https://www.warner.senate.gov/
public/_cache/files/8/6/861d66b8-93bf-4c93-84d0-6bea67235047/8061BCEEBF4300EC702B4E894247
D0E0.iot-cybesecurity-improvement-act---fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
121. Id. at 1.
122. Id.
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and Professor Jonathan Zittrain,123 but it also has its critics.124 Unfortunately, the
bill died, due in large part to industry resistance,125 leading one to consider
alternatives. Indeed, other bills have also been addressed in Congress designed
to improve IoT security, including the IoT Consumer TIPS Act of 2017, which
is aimed at helping the FTC boost consumer cyber hygiene, as well as the
SMART IoT Act, which would mandate that the U.S. Department of Commerce
“conduct a study on the state of the industry.”126 In 2019, the IoT Cybersecurity
Improvement Act of 2019 was introduced by Senator Mark Warner, which
would require NIST and the OMB to establish new IoT cybersecurity guidelines
for federal agencies.127
E. CIVIL SOCIETY
Rather than strict regulations, many industry groups prefer self-regulation
“to [better] adapt to rapid technological progress.”128 In some circumstances,
such efforts can be more cost effective than command and control-style
regulation,129 though it is not a panacea given that such efforts are voluntary and
subject to market forces (for example, consumer demands), which is why
communal self-governance is but one element of polycentric governance
discussed in Part III.130 One organization that is trying to create such a
community is Consumer Reports through its Digital Standard, which was
launched in 2017 and is designed “to measure the privacy and security of
products, apps, and services . . . [to] put consumers in the driver’s seat as the
digital marketplace evolves.”131 The goal of the effort is to inform and empower
consumers to make better decisions about the types of products and services

123. Id. at 2.
124. See Brian Krebs, New Bill Seeks Basic IoT Security Standards, KREBS ON SEC. (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/08/new-bill-seeks-basic-iot-security-standards/.
125. See S. 1691 (115th): Internet of Things (IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/s1691 (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
126. Robertson, supra note 107.
127. Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019, S. 734, 116th Cong. § 3 (2019).
128. MONROE E. PRICE & STEFAAN G. VERHULST, SELF-REGULATION AND THE INTERNET 21 (2005).
According to Notre Dame Professor Don Howard, different online communities “have a complicated topology
and geography, with overlap, hierarchy, varying degrees of mutual isolation and mutual interaction. There are
also communities of corporations or corporate persons, gangs of thieves, and bands of angels doing charity on
scales small and large.” Don Howard, Civic Virtue and Cybersecurity, in THE NATURE OF PEACE AND THE
MORALITY OF ARMED CONFLICT 181, 192 (Florian Demont-Biaggi ed., 2017). What is more, Professor Howard
argues that these communities will each construct norms in their own ways, and at their own rates, but that this
process has the potential to make positive progress toward addressing multifaceted issues such as enhancing
cybersecurity. Id. at 193.
129. See PRICE & VERHULST, supra note 128, at 21–22.
130. Ostrom, supra note 65, at 2–3.
131. Consumer Reports Launches Digital Standard to Safeguard Consumers’ Security and Privacy in
Complex Marketplace, CONSUMER REPS. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/media-room/pressreleases/2017/03/consumer_reports_launches_digital_standard_to_safeguard_consumers_security_and_privac
y_in_complex_marketplace/.
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based on privacy and security features, rewarding firms that make those
attributes central components of their business models.132
As the Digital Standard is refined, it may well help shape global IoT
governance.133 Already, Consumer Reports is working with European
colleagues to harmonize its Digital Standard, which could lead to further norm
building efforts around cybersecurity due diligence in the IoT context as is
discussed in Part IV.134 However, obstacles remain in this context given the
diverging regulatory stances of the United States and the EU when it comes to
IoT governance, as is further explored in the analysis accompanying Table 1.135

III. E.U. CASE STUDY
The EU has long taken a more comprehensive approach to both
cybersecurity and data privacy than the United States, which is now playing out
in the IoT context.136 For example, in late 2015 the European Commission
launched Horizon 2020, which included goals for smart cities and IoT
deployment,137 with plans to secure the full range of IoT devices by extending
product liability.138 Indeed, even though there have not yet been sweeping
changes to the IoT regulatory landscape, it is worth noting that France has
extended the EU’s Product Liability Directive to include IoT, making it the
first—but likely not the last—EU Member State to take this step.139 There has
been a push to finalize the EU’s ePrivacy Regulation, which is set to replace the
2002 ePrivacy Directive and will accompany and in some ways reinforce GDPR,
but industry resistance has meant that as of this writing the Regulation remains
in draft form.140 The Netherlands’ Radiocommunication Agency has also
132. See Glow Pregnancy App Exposed Women to Privacy Threats, Consumer Reports Finds, CONSUMER
REPS., https://www.consumerreports.org/mobile-security-software/glow-pregnancy-app-exposed-women-toprivacy-threats/ (Sept. 17, 2020).
133. See Paul Hiebert, Consumer Reports in the Age of the Amazon Review, ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/consumer-reports-in-the-age-of-the-amazonreview/477108/ (“More than 120 employees, with an annual testing budget of approximately $25 million,
evaluate some 3,000 products a year. The results of these impartial studies are then gathered, examined, and
published, ad-free, in Consumer Reports.”); Allen St. John, Europe’s GDPR Brings Data Portability to U.S.
Consumers, CONSUMER REPS. (May 25, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/privacy/gdpr-brings-dataportability-to-us-consumers/.
134. For a thorough accounting of international cybersecurity norms and how they overlap, see International
Cybersecurity Norms, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE, https://carnegieendowment.org/special
projects/cybernorms/?lang=en (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
135. See infra Part IV.
136. See, e.g., Scott Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widening Sea, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Nov. 4,
2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/11/04/seeking-a-safe-harbor-in-a-widening-sea/.
137. EUR. COMM’N, HORIZON 2020 WORK PROGRAMME 2016–2017, at 90 (2015),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/sites/digital-agenda/files/discussions/h2020-wp1617-focus_en.pdf.
138. Id. at 90, 93.
139. See CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, MANAGERS AND THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS
282 (9th ed. 2019); Lukasz Olejnik, Highlights of the French Cybersecurity Strategy, SEC., PRIV. & TECH
INQUIRIES (Feb. 13, 2018), https://blog.lukaszolejnik.com/highlights-of-french-cybersecurity-strategy/.
140. See Kristof Van Quathem, New Draft ePrivacy Regulation Released, COVINGTON: INSIDE PRIVACY
(Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/international/european-union/new-draft-eprivacy-regulation-
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supported expanding the European CE mark, which already applies to some
twenty product groups such as appliance and toys, to include privacy and
security benchmarks alongside safety, health, and environmental sustainability,
but this proposal has similarly not yet been acted upon as of this writing.141
A. GDPR’S APPLICATION TO IOT SECURITY
One of the main ways that the EU will shape IoT governance is through
GDPR, which is an expansive regulatory regime featuring a wide array of
requirements on covered entities such as data portability and the right to be
forgotten.142 An important aspect is GDPR’s push for covered entities to create
codes of conduct as an affirmative defense against regulatory action, an example
that Australia has followed with its new Code of Practice for the Manufacture of
IoT Devices.143 Yet these regulations were not drafted with IoT in mind, despite
a 2017 finding by the European Union Agency for Network and Information
Security (ENISA) “that there were no ‘legal guidelines for IoT device and
service trust.’ Nor any ‘level zero defined for the security and privacy of
connected and smart devices.’”144 Future European-level data protection
regulation takes time—GDPR took more than four years to be adopted after first
being proposed, meaning that relying on this same process to boost IoT security
could prove problematic.145 However, nations can go further than the EU as an
organization. For example, the UK has also been active in developing
cybersecurity standards, which is the illustrative example we turn to next. Such
national case studies are important since the NIS Directive gives wide latitude
to EU Member States to develop cybersecurity standards for critical
infrastructure, and relatedly IoT.
B. NATIONAL CASE STUDY: UNITED KINGDOM & BREXIT
The UK has sought to secure critical infrastructure and in so doing help
operationalize the NIS Directive through the development of IoT standards, a

released/. The nonprofit Internet Society also plans on publishing “concrete recommendations” to address IoT
privacy and security risks in France. Internet Society Advances IoT Security in France, INTERNET SOC’Y (Jan.
8, 2019), https://www.internetsociety.org/news/press-releases/2019/internet-society-advances-iot-security-infrance/.
141. See, e.g., Dutch Regulator Calls for IoT Security Standards, MOBILE EUR. (June 5, 2018),
https://www.mobileeurope.co.uk/press-wire/13263-dutch-regulator-calls-for-iot-security-standards.
142. See, e.g., INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., TOP 10 OPERATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE GDPR 23–24 (2016),
https://iapp.org/store/books/a191a0000027z5rAAA/.
143. See James Coker, Australia Introduces Code of Practice for the Manufacture of IoT Devices,
INFOSECURITY MAG. (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/australia-code-of-practiceiot/.
144. Scott Gordon, Will We Get a GDPR for the IoT?, INFOSEC ISLAND (Nov. 28, 2018),
http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/25140-Will-We-Get-a-GDPR-for-the-IoT.html.
145. Id.
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process which began with the 2011 UK Cyber Security Strategy.146 However,
the 2011 Strategy did not specifically address IoT security.147 As such, it was
revised in 2014 to create the Cyber Essentials Certification Program,148 which
has the goal of “incentivis[ing] widespread adoption of basic security controls
that will help to protect organisations against the commonest kind of Internet
attacks.”149 Specifically, the Cyber Essentials Certification calls on businesses
to follow the British government’s Ten Steps to Cyber Security, which is
reminiscent of the FTC’s Guide for Business discussed in Part II.150 The more
recent 2016 UK National Cybersecurity Strategy moves forward on some of
these issues, but only references IoT issues in passing.151 Still, the Cyber
Essentials Program has produced a following, and as a result has helped
businesses across the country market cybersecurity as a competitive advantage,
instead of merely a cost of doing business.152 The British government has also
made its Cyber Essentials Certification mandatory for all public-sector
contractors handling PII.153 Moreover, it has also announced plans to require
applications geared for children to have built-in privacy protections.154
In short, Britain’s Cyber Essentials effort is intended as supplementation
of existing organizational approaches to risk management, but with plans for a
mandatory IoT labeling scheme.155 To that end, the IoT Security Foundation
(IoTSF) has worked with IASME to create the IASME BASIC IoT Security
Scheme, which aligns with and expands upon the Cyber Essentials Program.
Beginning in April 2020, IASME has been chosen by the National Cyber
Security Centre to be the sole Cyber Essentials Scheme Accreditation body for

146. UK CABINET OFF., THE UK CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: PROTECTING AND PROMOTING THE UK IN A
DIGITAL WORLD 27 (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
60961/uk-cyber-security-strategy-final.pdf.
147. Id.
148. UK CABINET OFF., THE UK CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: REPORT ON PROGRESS AND FORWARD PLANS
7 (2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/38
6093/The_UK_Cyber_Security_Strategy_Report_on_Progress_and_Forward_Plans_-_De___.pdf.
149. Id.
150. 10 Steps to Cyber Security, NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR., https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/10-steps-tocyber-security (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
151. H.M. GOV ’T, NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY 2016–2021, at 40 (2016),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/567242/nati
onal_cyber_security_strategy_2016.pdf.
152. See About Cyber Essentials, NAT’L CYBER SEC. CTR., https://www.cyberessentials.
ncsc.gov.uk/getting-certified/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
153. See Policy Paper, 2010 to 2015 Government Policy: Cyber Security, UK GOV’T, https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-cyber-security/2010-to-2015-government-policycyber-security#appendix-7-working-with-industry-on-minimum-standards-and-principles (May 8, 2015).
154. See Fahmida Y. Rashid, UK Says Children’s Apps Must Have Built-In Privacy, DECIPHER (Sept. 3,
2020), https://duo.com/decipher/uk-says-childrens-apps-must-have-built-in-privacy.
155. See Charles Towers-Clark, UK to Introduce New Law for IoT Device Security, FORBES (May 2, 2019,
11:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlestowersclark/2019/05/02/uk-to-introduce-new-law-for-iotdevice-security/#4b0d8688579d.
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the UK.156 Relatedly, the UK has taken steps to clarify IoT labeling for
consumers and manufacturers in an effort led by its Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport.157 More recently, the UK government introduced
legislation “to hold firms manufacturing and stocking Internet-connected
devices to account to stop hackers threatening people’s privacy and safety.”158
The legislation includes the prohibition of default passwords for IoT devices.159
These developments place the UK as a unique success story of public-private
collaboration in IoT security and highlights the different track it has taken from
France, a division that may widen post-Brexit.160
It remains unclear, however, what impact Brexit will have on the UK’s
cybersecurity efforts generally, as well as IoT cybersecurity in particular. For
example, the UK has taken the affirmative step of codifying GDPR into its
domestic legislation through its Data Protection Act of 2018, which will
presumably stay in effect regardless of the final Brexit settlement.161 However,
it is unclear whether or not the UK will continue to incorporate future updates
or GDPR revisions into its domestic law, potentially placing British firms at a
disadvantage to continental peers. If it voluntarily leaves, or is involuntarily
thrown out, then it could place new barriers to British firms seeking to operate
in the EU in the areas of creative content production, data protection, copyright,
and e-commerce.162 Related questions remain unanswered about Britain’s postBrexit participation in law enforcement collaborations like Europol, along with
the impact on the EU if Britain limited its intelligence sharing with EU allies
given its special position as a member of the Five Eyes.163 IoT presents
especially problematic issues given the broad ecosystem of devices and
156. UK Government Cyber Essentials Scheme, CST, https://www.cstl.com/CST/Cyber-Essentials/ (last
visited Feb. 4, 2021).
157. See Consultation on the Government’s Regulatory Proposals Regarding Consumer Internet of Things
(IoT) Security, UK GOV ’T, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/consultation-on-regulatoryproposals-on-consumer-iot-security/consultation-on-the-governments-regulatory-proposals-regardingconsumer-internet-of-things-iot-security (May 1, 2019).
158. Matt Warman, Why the UK Is Banning Default Passwords in IoT Devices, NS TECH (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://tech.newstatesman.com/security/uk-banning-default-passwords.
159. See id.
160. Cf. Steve Ranger, After Brexit, Europe Wants Cybersecurity Pact with UK, ZDNET (Nov. 6, 2019),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/after-brexit-europe-wants-cybersecurity-pact-with-uk/ (noting that the EU is
keen to develop a cybersecurity intelligence sharing relationship with the UK post-Brexit).
161. See GDPR and Brexit: How Will One Affect the Other?, IT PRO (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.itpro.co.uk/policy-legislation/31772/gdpr-and-brexit-how-will-one-affect-the-other.
162. See Ros Taylor, Distress Signals: How Brexit Affects the Digital Single Market, LSE BREXIT (Dec. 3,
2018), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/12/03/distress-signals-how-brexit-affects-the-digital-single-market/
(“This is because companies need an EU base (i.e. to be headquartered in the EU) to access service markets
under Directives and Regulations which contain the country of origin (COO) principle (e.g. under AVMSD,
SatCab, E-commerce and Copyright Directives).”).
163. These worries come in two flavors: (1) operational impacts (that is, the nitty gritty of cyber deterrence
and cybercrime investigation); and (2) policy impacts, namely the EU losing often the loudest voice for a more
private-sector friendly, risk-management based approach to mitigating privacy and cybersecurity risks. This
could push the EU to take an even harder line on protecting personal privacy, which might well be a boon for
consumers, but could impact the types of innovative business that take root on the continent.
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networks in question that often span national boundaries. If the UK is not part
of broader EU efforts to develop IoT certifications and trustmarks, along with
not employing updated versions of GDPR and the NIS Directive, it could further
isolate British tech firms from finding new markets for their IoT products and
services.
C. SUMMARY
The foregoing analysis highlights the disparity of approaches to IoT
governance generally and security in particular that are being attempted in the
United States and EU. The EU, for example, seems to be mirroring its approach
to data privacy by moving in a direction of comprehensive regulation,
particularly if more EU Member States follow France’s lead in extending
products liability to include IoT. The United States, on the other hand, is
maintaining a largely voluntary, sector-specific approach to IoT security and
privacy, though as leading states such as California enact new protections that
might begin to change. The UK, perhaps in particular post-Brexit, seems to be
positioning itself as a middle ground between these two bottom-up and top-down
extremes, as exemplified in its Cyber Essentials Plus Certification public-private
program and IoT security mandates. Still, such disparity makes it challenging
for IoT firms with global ambitions to navigate between these competing
regulatory schemes.
These results may be summarized in terms of an IoT governance spectrum,
attempted in Figure 1 below, which is unpacked in Part IV. States with a
relatively low degree of state involvement in IoT governance are positioned at
the left side of this spectrum, with states—particularly those like France that
now treat IoT as a component of products liability—on the right side.
Figure 1: IoT Governance Spectrum

Included within this governance spectrum is an array of different policy
options that are being pursued in the transatlantic context, to say nothing of
efforts underway across other cyber powers in Asia and beyond.164 These

164. See, e.g., JOHN CHEN, EMILY WALZ, BRIAN LAFFERTY, JOE MCREYNOLDS, KIERAN GREEN, JONATHAN
RAY & J AMES MULVENON, CHINA’S INTERNET OF THINGS 45–46 (2018), https://www.uscc.gov/
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include a spate of options described in Parts II and III ranging from safe harbors
in Ohio to trustmarks in the EU, which are in turn summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Approaches to IoT Governance
Type of
Approach
Safe Harbor

Reasonableness
Standard

Dislosure
Requirements

Data Privacy &
Codes of
Conduct
IoT
Trustmarks
Products
Liability

Description
Incentivizing businesses to “develop and maintain a
cybersecurity program that ‘reasonably conforms’
to an already existing, industry recognized
cybersecurity framework” like the NIST CSF.165
“[A]ny manufacturer of a device that connects
‘directly or indirectly’ to the Internet must equip it
with ‘reasonable’ security features, designed to
prevent unauthorized access, modification, or
information disclosure.”166
“Given the frequency, magnitude and cost of
cybersecurity incidents, the Commission believes
that it is critical that public companies take all
required actions to inform investors about material
cybersecurity risks and incidents in a timely
fashion, including those companies that are subject
to material cybersecurity risks but may not yet have
been the target of a cyber-attack.”167
Incentivizes firms to develop industry codes of
conduct to consider the wider risk of cyber threats
to IoT ecosystems.
Focusing on consumers by informing them of the
risks posed by various IoT devices and services.
Treating breaches related to IoT products under a
strict liability standard.

Example
Jurisdiction
Ohio

California

SEC; statelevel
disclosure
requirements

GDPR;
Australia
EU CE
Marking
France

What mix of these approaches might make sense in a given context will be
dependent upon the unique legal traditions and cultures of different jurisdictions.
Thus, while there is certainly a place for benchmarks—such as the ability to
update software for IoT devices—adequate room should also be made for
bottom up experimentation and innovation, as we argue further in Part IV.

IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This final Part reviews the policy implications revealed by the governance
gaps highlighted above. First, we review what lessons can be learned from how
the Internet itself evolved. Governance best practices are, in turn, analyzed and
sites/default/files/Research/SOSi_China's%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf (noting the involvement of China
in international IoT standards setting).
165. Mary Grob, New Cybersecurity Law Offers Safe Harbor Against Tort Claims, JD SUPRA (Nov. 26,
2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-cybersecurity-law-offers-safe-91430/.
166. Robertson, supra note 107.
167. Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 Fed. Reg.
8166, 8167 (Feb. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229, 249).
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applied to IoT. Second, we import these lessons as to the relative benefits of
bottom-up and top-down approaches to managing an array of IoT governance
challenges exemplified in Figure 1 to the field of cybersecurity due diligence in
an effort to harden the emerging Internet of Things against nation-state attacks.
A. POLYCENTRIC INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The foregoing analysis paints a fragmented governance picture of the state
of transatlantic IoT regulation. Indeed, given the pervasive types of devices,
networks, and technologies that together comprise the Internet of Things, it is
very unlikely that a unitary governance structure could or should be created to
manage the myriad privacy and security threats faced within this context.
Instead, as has been argued, a polycentric framework is useful in conceptualizing
the state of IoT governance. This, in turn, helps to highlight gaps that may be
taken advantage of by foreign national states and other adversaries. Table 2
represents an effort to distill the various regimes analyzed throughout the
Article, which are mapped in turn onto the Ostrom Design Principles introduced
above.
Table 2: Regime Effectiveness of IoT Governance Through the Lens of the
Ostrom Design Principles168
Ostrom Design
Principle
Clearly Defined
Boundaries

Applicability

Fit to Local
Conditions &
Proportionality

Fostered

UK Cyber Essentials
Plus Certificate;
Digital Standard;
Internet of Things
Cybersecurity Act of
2017 (proposed)

CollectiveChoice

Fostered

NIST CSF; Paris Call

Contested

Example Regulatory
Regime
NIST CSF; FTC
Guidelines

Explanation
Defined boundaries are
problematic given the
extent to which various
smart devices from
automobiles to
thermostats, and even
toasters, interconnect to
form ecosystems.
The problem of
proportionality is a
frequent refrain in the
cybersecurity context
where few providers
invest as much as they
should in proactive
cybersecurity measures
because the full benefits
of such investments are
not realized by the firm.
This principle implies
the importance of

168. This table is adapted from Forrest D. Fleischman, Natalie C. Ban, Louisa S. Evans, Graham Epstein,
Gustavo Garcia-Lopez, & Sergio Villamayor-Thomas, Governing Large-Scale Social-Ecological Systems:
Lessons from Five Cases, 8 INT’L J. COMMONS 428, 436 tbl.3 (2014).
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Arrangements

Monitoring

Fostered

Digital Standard; FTC;
European
Commission;
Cybersecurity Tech
Accord

Graduated
Sanctions

Fostered

GDPR; 2018
California Law; FTC

Minimal
Recognition of
Rights to
Organize

Present

GDPR, U.S.
Constitution

Nested
Enterprises

Present

IETF; Consumer
Reports; Information
Sharing and Analysis
Centers (ISACs)
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engaged and proactive
rulemaking by technical
communities, the
private sector, and the
international
community.
According to Professor
Ostrom, trust can
typically only do so
much to mitigate rulebreaking behavior.
Eventually, some level
of monitoring becomes
important. In selforganized communities,
typically monitors are
chosen among the
members to ensure “the
conformance of others
to local rules.”169
Rule violations must not
pass without notice or
correction by the group.
This principle
recognizes the
importance of
permitting stakeholders
a say in organizing
collective rules.
Underscores the extent
to which multilevel,
multi-stakeholder
governance structures
are vital to instill
governance best
practices.

Although Table 2 does not represent a comprehensive analysis of the state
of IoT governance and should only be considered among the first and certainly
not the last word on how best to apply insights from the Ostrom Design
Principles to this collective action problem, the analysis does reinforce several
points that were raised throughout the paper. For example, it is clear that more
needs to be done to clarify liability structures and, in so doing, simplify
boundaries of responsibility within the Internet of Things. That is being done
now in the EU, and to an extent in California as was discussed in Part II.
Similarly, graduated sanctions need to be clarified, and enforced, across more
jurisdictions. GDPR is a helpful step in this direction, as again is the 2018
California laws mentioned above, but they must be complemented by efforts

169. Ostrom, supra note 76, at 121.
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from other G20 nations, as is discussed further below. Finally, public-private
partnerships are needed to foster threat monitoring across these various networks
and systems such as by taking advantage of successful nested entities like
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).
In all, Table 2 underscores the extent to which top-down, global
governance of IoT security is neither likely nor optimal given the extent to which
polycentric structures are needed to define, monitor, and enforce best practices.
This will result, and indeed already has resulted, in regulatory competition
between Washington, Sacramento, Brussels, and even Beijing, among other
players, but that is nothing new in the cybersecurity or data privacy context. The
trick is, and will remain, to manage these competitions in ways that help promote
good governance overall, similar to how Ostrom uncovered the benefits of small
and medium-sized governance units over top-down approaches such as in the
case of metropolitan policing.170 Such insights not only have salience across
domestic CPR contexts such as watersheds, but also online, as is explored next.
B. LOOKING BACK: APPLYING LESSONS FROM INTERNET GOVERNANCE TO IOT
SECURITY
The Internet has succeeded rather well in spite of the fact that only the
period of time that the Internet had any Internet-specific governance is before it
became the Internet–the pre-Internet ARPANET (before 1983)—and for a few
years thereafter. During this time, ARPANET, and the overlapping NSFNET,
were paid for and operated under contract with the U.S. government.171 But with
the end of the government-run Internet backbone networks in the early 1990s
and the rise of independent commercial Internet service providers came the end
of an integrated governance structure. Instead, Internet service providers in the
United States and elsewhere informally agreed to use the same set of technical
standards and developed bilateral contracts between themselves.172 Together,
these agreements and complementary technical standards are what enabled the
Internet to scale to the ubiquity that it enjoys today.
The Internet technical standards are a key part of the Internet’s success and
the standards did start with U.S. government action. A decade after the first
nodes of the ARPANET were interconnected in 1969, ARPA chartered a
committee, the Internet Configuration Control Board (ICCB) to “guide the
technical evolution of the [Internet] protocol suite.”173 After several

170. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, ROGER B. PARKS, & GORDON P. WHITAKER, PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN
POLICING 2 (1978).
171. See A Brief History of NSF and the Internet, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Aug. 13, 2003),
https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=103050.
172. Memorandum from Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President of Corp. for Nat’l Rsch. Initiatives (May 1990),
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1160.txt.
173. Id.
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transformations the ICCB evolved into the IETF,174 which is currently the
primary technical standards body for the Internet.175 The technical standards
developed or maintained by the IETF are voluntary; the government does not
mandate adherence to them but if an ISP or an equipment vendor does not
support a core set of technical standards they would not be able to interoperate
with the rest of the Internet. Proprietary standards for particular Internet
applications do exist but their use is restricted to those systems that adopt the
specific proprietary standards and even those systems must support the core set
of technical standards in order for their communications to be transported over
the Internet.
Unlike the major telecommunications standards organizations such as the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), neither governments, nor their
representatives, have any special role in the IETF standards development or
approval. In addition, for more than two decades the IETF has been supported
by meeting fees and the Internet Society and has not received direct support from
any governments. Thus, the IETF is a fully independent international standards
development organization, free from government influence, that creates
standards that a rough consensus of IETF participants feel are technically
sound.176 As such, it mirrors the Ostrom design principles highlighting the value
of nested, empowered governance through engaged communities working at
various scales.
The IETF is currently working on IoT-related technical standards,177
specifically including IoT security, but getting widespread adoption of the
resulting standards will still be a challenge similar to the debate about how best
to foster uptake of the NIST CSF. The IETF defines and maintains the standards
for the technology that the Internet itself uses to transport information as well as
the standards for the devices connecting to the Internet and the applications
running on these devices and over the Internet. This technology includes
security-enabling technology. As such, it plays an important role in Internet
governance, which the United States and EU are working to augment.
Over the years there have been many attempts to formalize Internet
governance, such as granting a greater governance role to the ITU.178 But, to
date, none of these efforts have succeeded, though there have been important
milestones along the way such as the creation of the Internet Governance Forum

174. Id.; see also About, INTERNET ENG ’G TASK FORCE, https://www.ietf.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 4,
2021).
175. Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN
SOURCE REVOLUTION 47, 47 (Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman & Mark Stone eds., 1999).
176. Id.
177. Ari Keränen & Carsten Borman, Internet of Things: Standards and Guidance from the IETF, IETF J.
(Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.ietfjournal.org/internet-of-things-standards-and-guidance-from-the-ietf/.
178. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Enrique Oti, Jaclyn A. Kerr, Elaine Korzak, & Andreas Kuehn, Back to
the Future of Internet Governance?, 16 GEO. J. INT’L AFF. 83, 84 (2015).
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in 2006 and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s decision not to renew its
contract with the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) in 2016.179 However, taking the IETF as a model would argue that the
United States voluntary security standards could be a successful path to security
for the IoT, as opposed to the UK’s Cyber Essentials Plus Certificate Program.
But there is a significant difference between the Internet’s voluntary technical
standards and the voluntary security standards provided by NIST and others: a
device that does not correctly implement the Internet technical standards will not
be able to operate in the Internet, a strong forcing factor. On the other hand, a
device that does not correctly implement security standards will interoperate,
even though at a risk to the wider Internet ecosystem.180 Thus, voluntary
technical standards, on their own, will likely not be sufficient when it comes to
IoT security given the market failures discussed in Part I.
C. LOOKING AHEAD: OPERATIONALIZING CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE IN
THE IOT CONTEXT
At least two strategic paths forward can help firms, and the jurisdictions
under which they operate, mitigate cyber risk in the IoT context. The first option
is to further refine and operationalize the concept of cybersecurity due diligence,
which is a general term used here in reference to enhancing the defense-in-depth
utilizing multiple layers of protection of IoT devices along with the cyber
hygiene of consumers. However, determining exactly what nations’ due
diligence obligations are to secure IoT devices and to prosecute or extradite
cyber attackers is no simple matter.181 A key aspect of this effort is effective
information sharing; for example, government intelligence agencies cooperating
with one another to detect such attacks and demonstrating a willingness to
inform the targets. Without such information, the targets would often not even
know if they were under attack, since few sophisticated attacks are detected,182
and would not know that they needed to strengthen their defenses.
179. Elizabeth Weise, U.S. Set to Hand Over Internet Address Book, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2016, 8:52
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/09/29/icann-iana-internet-address-book-autonomousdepartment-of-commerce-ip-address-transition-internet-corporation-for-assigned-names-and-numbers/9128
1960/. For more on this history, see Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New “Digital Divide”:
Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity,
50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014).
180. For more on this interconnection with broader conceptions of risk management particularly in the
environmental context, see Scott J. Shackelford, On Climate Change and Cyber Attacks: Leveraging Polycentric
Governance to Mitigate Global Collective Action Problems, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 653 (2016).
181. See Mark Thompson, Iranian Cyber Attack on New York Dam Shows the Future of War, TIME (Mar.
24, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://time.com/4270728/iran-cyber-attack-dam-fbi/; Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger,
Cyberattacks Put Russian Fingers on the Switch at Power Plants, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/us/politics/russia-cyberattacks.html; Andrea Peterson, Sony Pictures
Hack, Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2014, 1:15 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/12/18/the-sony-pictures-hack-explained/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.20762a025643.
182. VERIZON, 2018 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 40 (11th ed. 2018),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324455350_2018_Verizon_Data_Breach_Investigations_Report.
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As we have seen, the United States and EU are taking different approaches
toward IoT governance generally and increasing the responsibility for
conducting cybersecurity due diligence by covered firms in particular. The
United States has predominantly relied on a loose set of standards developed by
NIST, IETF, and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), in collaboration with
industry-specific groups, which are then (imperfectly and incompletely)
enforced through FTC settlement orders. Yet recent developments—including
California cybersecurity and privacy laws summarized above—will place new
requirements on IoT manufacturers in a critical market that will likely cause
many organizations to weigh whether it is worth designing specific products for
California or making those standards the default. This process could be hastened
by the growing uptake and popularity of the Consumer Reports Digital
Standard, and mirrors the calculus that many, particularly in the United States,
are having to undertake in considering how best to comply with GDPR.
In the EU generally, and the UK in particular, we are also seeing a growing
interest in mandatory certification schemes to enhance IoT security against a
range of cyber threats.183 France might quicken this pace given its new approach
to IoT product liability. As was shown, GDPR and the NIS Directive in
particular are having an immediate impact on IoT manufacturers, which would
only accelerate if the proposed French law shifting IoT liability is enacted (as
with the pending IoT bills in Congress that were similarly summarized above).
Eventually, such efforts could lead to greater harmonization, even a shared
transatlantic approach to IoT security based around certain core fundamentals
(such as banning hard-coded passwords, ensuring the ability to update devices,
and enhancing consumer cyber hygiene) along with broader efforts to boost
cybersecurity due diligence across the region.
Progress has also been made on defining the international norms for
cybersecurity due diligence. The G7 Declaration on Responsible States
Behavior in Cyberspace, for example, maintains that “States should not
knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using
ICTs.”184 The UN Group of Governmental Experts has reiterated this norm.185
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 Rule 6 maintains, “[a] State must exercise due diligence
in not allowing its territory, or territory or cyber infrastructure under its
governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights of,
and produce serious adverse consequences for, other States.”186 Other

183. See, e.g., Gianmarco Baldini, Antonio Skarmeta, Elizabeta Fourneret, Richardo Niesse, Bruno Legeard,
& Franck Le Gall, Security Certification and Labelling in Internet of Things, 2016 IEEE 3RD WORLD FORUM
ON INTERNET OF THINGS (WF-IOT) 627, 628 (2016).
184. G7 DECLARATION ON RESPONSIBLE STATES BEHAVIOR IN CYBERSPACE 4 (2017),
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000246367.pdf.
185. Rep. of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. and Telecomms. in the Context
of Int’l Sec., ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/799853?ln=en.
186. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICATION TO CYBER OPERATIONS 30 (Michael
N. Schmitt ed., 2017).
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stakeholders, including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have also maintained that nations should not “use
information and communications technologies and information and
communications networks to carry out activities which run counter to the task
of maintaining international peace and security.”187 Eventually, such
harmonization could lead to new international agreements on the scope and
meaning of cybersecurity due diligence. However, such a day remains distant at
present given the extent to which such statements paper over significant
differences in what exactly constitutes due diligence especially in the context of
censorship and cyber sovereignty.188
In general, then, there is a need for a polycentric approach to enhancing
IoT cybersecurity to mitigate the risk of foreign nation-state cyber attacks on
vulnerable devices and systems. At a foundational level, this includes securing
the hardware and software supply chains on which these products are built.189 It
is similarly vital to leverage market forces to reward companies that take security
and privacy seriously, such as through the Digital Standard and insurance
industry. There is also a role for governmental regulations to help speed the
uptake of cybersecurity due diligence best practices, as is happening now in both
the EU and in California. Over time, such national and regional efforts will help
to crystallize a cybersecurity due diligence norm, particularly as it pertains to
the protection of critical infrastructure, which is being made increasingly
“smart” and thus vulnerable to foreign nation-state cyber attacks. All of these
governance levels are components of an effort to practice “deterrence by denial”
as an alternative to the threat of offensive counterstrikes, though in reality both
are being practiced.190 Progress is being made at all of these governance levels,
as has been discussed, including through the NIST CSF and EU’s GDPR in
particular. Yet further efforts are needed, as was made evident when the
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)191 surveyed IT
professionals in the UK and found that “75 percent of the security experts polled
say they do not believe device manufacturers are implementing sufficient
security measures in IoT devices, and a further 73 percent say existing security
187. Letter dated 9 Jan. 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the
Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N.
Doc. A/69/723 (Jan. 13, 2015), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/014/02/PDF/N150
1402.pdf?OpenElement.
188. See, e.g., Adam Segal, Chinese Responses to the International Strategy for Cyberspace, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELS. (May 23, 2011), http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/05/23/chinese-responses-to-the-internationalstrategy-for-cyberspace/; Gerry Smith, State Department Official Accuses Russia and China of Seeking Greater
Internet Control, HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/27/russia-china-internet-control_n_
984223.html (Nov. 27, 2011).
189. See Shackelford et al., supra note 38, at 405.
190. See Scott J. Shackelford, Michael Sulmeyer, Amanda N. Craig Deckard, Ben Buchanan & Brian Micic,
From Russia with Love: Understanding the Russian Cyber Threat to U.S. Critical Infrastructure and What to
Do About It, 96 NEB. L. REV. 320, 335–38 (2017).
191. Previously known as Information Systems Audit and Control Association. See About Us, ISACA,
http://www.isaca.org/about-isaca/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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standards in the industry do not sufficiently address IoT specific security
concerns.”192
The international community has recognized the issues replete in the
Internet of Everything. On November 12, 2018, French President Emmanuel
Macron gave a speech at the Internet Governance Forum in Paris, announcing
the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace—a high-level multistakeholder statement of principles that did not necessarily break new ground in
cyber norm building, but did crystallize several ongoing efforts including those
mentioned above. In particular, the agreement calls for action to safeguard
civilian infrastructure, promote Internet access, and make democracy harder to
hack.193 On the day it was announced, more than fifty nations (with the notable
exception of the United States), along with “more than 130 companies and 90
universities and nongovernmental groups” signed the Paris Call.194 Even though
the United States, China, and Russia did not sign the accord, a number of cyber
powers did, including the UK and France, and as such it is a prime example of
the type of polycentric action needed to harden IoT devices.195
A number of trust-building steps should be taken on this journey. One final
concrete idea that policymakers could consider is again pulled from the annals
of Internet governance. In particular, “regional techs” were regular gatherings in
which Internet architects got together to discuss operational issues and norms on
the nascent Internet.196 Over time, these gatherings morphed into the North
American Network Operators Group (NANOG).197 This might be a possible
model for a technical-community-based group to develop operational standards
and norms for the IoT governance and to supplement the existing ecosystem by
providing a space for higher-level coordination. Such an iterative process,
building on the success of initiatives like the NIST CSF, could prove helpful in
clarifying questions of IoT governance and security, and ultimately encouraging
more consumers—and requiring more manufacturers—to update their toasters
and other IoT products.

192. Existing Security Standards Do Not Sufficiently Address IoT, HELP NET SEC. (Oct. 15, 2015)
http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=18981 (emphasis added).
193. See MINISTRY OF EUR. & FOREIGN AFFS., PARIS CALL FOR TRUST AND SECURITY IN CYBERSPACE
(2018), https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/paris_call_text_-_en_cle06f918.pdf.
194. David E. Sanger, U.S. Declines to Sign Declaration Discouraging Use of Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/us/politics/us-cyberattacks-declaration.html; Indiana
University Among First to Endorse Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, NEWS AT IU (Nov. 12,
2018), https://news.iu.edu/stories/2018/11/iu/releases/12-paris-call-for-trust-and-security-in-cyberspace.html
#:~:text=BLOOMINGTON%2C%20Ind.,at%20the%20Paris%20Peace%20Forum.
195. See MINISTRY OF EUR. & FOREIGN AFF., supra note 193.
196. See Technical Community, AM. REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, https://www.arin.net/
about/relations/community/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
197. See What We Do, NANOG, https://www.nanog.org/about/what-we-do/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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CONCLUSION
As the IoT matures, so far it looks set to follow a similar route as the early
days of Internet governance, though on an even larger scale, spanning myriad
sectors and industries, in spite of the limitations of voluntary technical standards
discussed above. Polycentric IoT regimes can help keep pace with these
technological and regulatory changes.198 This includes a mixture of standards—
including a NIST IoT-specific effort—along with civil society efforts such as
the Digital Standard, and the use of corporate governance structures, such as
sustainability, and international norms, including due diligence. This all-of-theabove approach is vital to filling in governance gaps. As Professor Elinor
Ostrom said, this is not a “keep it simple, stupid” response,199 but a multifaceted
one in keeping with the complexity of the crises in IoT governance.

198. See Adam Thierer, Putting Privacy Concerns About the Internet of Things in Perspective, INT’L ASSOC.
PRIVACY PROS. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/putting-privacy-concerns-about-the-internet-of-thingsin-perspective.
199. Jeffrey Weiss, Elinor Ostrom and the Triumph of the Commons, POL. DAILY (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://www.politicsdaily.com/2009/10/14/elinor-ostrom-and-the-triumph-of-the-commons/. The Authors are
grateful to Professors Fred Cate, David Fidler, and Anjanette Raymond among others for their comments,
suggestions, and insights on developing portions of this argumentation.
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